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W hen	we	first	meet	the	title	characters	of	Tom	Stoppard’s	Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead,	they	are	betting	on	coin	 throws.	 Rosencrantz	 has	 a	 standing	 bet	 on	 heads,	
and	he	keeps	winning,	pocketing	coin	after	coin.	We	soon	learn	that	
this	has	been	going	on	for	some	time,	and	that	no	fewer	than	76	con-
secutive	heads	have	been	thrown,	and	counting	—	a	situation	which	
is	making	Guildenstern	 increasingly	uneasy.	The	coins	don’t	appear	
to	be	double-headed	or	weighted	or	anything	like	that	—	just	ordinary	
coins	—	leading	 Guildenstern	 to	 consider	 several	 unsettling	 explana-
tions:	that	he	is	subconsciously	willing	the	coins	to	land	heads	in	order	
to	cleanse	himself	of	some	repressed	sin,	that	they	are	both	trapped	
reliving	the	same	moment	in	time	over	and	over	again,	that	the	coins	
are	being	controlled	by	some	menacing	supernatural	 force.	He	then	
proposes	a	fourth	hypothesis,	which	suggests	a	change	of	heart:	that	
nothing	surprising	 is	happening	at	all	and	no	special	explanation	 is	
needed.	He	says,	“…	each	individual	coin	spun	individually	is	as	likely	
to	come	down	heads	as	tails	and	therefore	should	cause	no	surprise	
each	individual	time	it	does.”	In	the	end	92	heads	are	thrown	without	
a	single	tail,	when	the	characters	are	interrupted.	
Absurdist	 plays	 sometimes	 feature	 extraordinary	 or	 fantastical	
events	that	aren’t	given	any	explanation,	and	serve	to	create	a	sense	
of	 disorientation	 and	 dislocation	—	like	 humans	 transforming	 into	
animals	in	Ionesco’s	Rhinoceros	or	objects	suddenly	bursting	into	flame	
in	Beckett’s	Happy Days.	Perhaps	Rosencrantz	and	Guildenstern’s	run	
of	92	heads	is	another	example	of	this.	And	yet,	in	one	way,	this	run	of	
heads	is	precisely	not	like	these	other	events.	What	is	remarkable	about	
the	opening	scene	of	Rosencrantz and Guildenstern	 is	 that,	although	it	
does	 succeed	 in	creating	a	 feeling	of	unreality,	once	you	drill	down	
into	the	details,	nothing extraordinary actually happens.	As	Guildenstern	
himself	points	out,	all	that	we	have	here	is	a	sequence	of	92	perfectly	
ordinary	events,	none	of	which	needs	any	explanation.
My	 aim	 here	 is	 to	 defend	 Guildenstern	—	or	 his	 last	 hypothesis,	
anyway.	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 there	 really	 is	 nothing surprising	 about	
throwing	92	heads	in	a	row	and	that	Guildenstern	more	or	less	explains	
why	—	though	 we	 may	 want	 to	 expand	 upon	 his	 reasoning	 a	 bit.	 I	
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But	 what	 if	 we	 consider	 two	 completely	 unrelated,	 independent	
events?	If	it’s	unsurprising	for	me	to	leave	for	work	at	8:30am	and	it’s	
unsurprising	for	my	work	colleague	Anna	to	arrive	at	work	at	8:31am,	
and	our	morning	commutes	have	absolutely	nothing	to	do	with	one	
another,	then	it	does	seem	to	follow	that	it	would	be	unsurprising	for	
me	to	leave	at	8:30	and	Anna	to	arrive	at	8:31.	Consider	the	following,	
which	 we	 might	 call	 the	 conjunction principle:	 If	 it’s	 unsurprising	 for	
event	e
1
	to	happen,	and	it’s	unsurprising	for	event	e
2
	to	happen,	and	
these	two	events	are	independent	of	one	another,	then	it’s	unsurprising	
for	e
1
	and	e
2
	to	both	happen.
When	we	flip	92	coins,	what	we	have	are	92	completely	independent	
events	—	how	one	coin	lands	has	nothing	at	all	to	do	with	how	other	
coins	have	landed	previously	or	how	other	coins	will	land	subsequently.	
Coins	 can’t	 predict	 the	 future	 and	 are	 not	 aware	 of	 the	 past.	 If	 it’s	
unsurprising	for	the	first	coin	to	land	heads,	and	it’s	unsurprising	for	
the	second	coin	to	land	heads,	and	these	are	independent	events,	then	
by	 the	conjunction	principle	 it’s	unsurprising	 for	 the	first	 two	coins	
to	land	heads.	If	it’s	unsurprising	for	the	first	two	coins	to	land	heads	
and	it’s	unsurprising	for	the	third	coin	to	land	heads	and	these	events	
are	independent,	then	it’s	unsurprising	for	the	first	three	coins	to	land	
heads.	And	so	on	right	up	to	92	—	or	even	further	if	we	wish.	If	it’s	not	
surprising	 for	 any	 particular	 coin	 to	 land	 heads,	 and	 we	 accept	 the	
conjunction	principle,	we	end	up	with	the	result	that	92	heads	in	a	row	
is	not	surprising.	This,	I	think,	is	a	fair	reconstruction	of	Guildenstern’s	
reasoning.	But	is	it	right?
In	the	1950s	and	’60s,	the	economist	George	Shackle	developed	a	
precise	mathematical	theory	of	surprise,	and	the	conjunction	principle	
is	 actually	 very	 like	 one	 of	 the	 principles	 of	 Shackle’s	 system	—	his	
‟axiom	 7”.	 According	 to	 Shackle,	 when	 two	 events	 e
1
	 and	 e
2
	 are	
independent,	 the	surprisingness	of	e
1
 & e
2
	 (which	 is	measured	by	a	
number	between	0	and	1)	 is	equal	to	the	surprisingness	of	e
1
	or	the	
surprisingness	of	e
2
	—	whichever	is	higher.	As	such,	if	e
1
	and	e
2
	are	both	
completely	unsurprising	 (each	have	surprisingness	values	of	0),	 then	
e
1
 &	e
2
	must	be	completely	unsurprising	too.	By	using	this	principle	
should	say	right	away	 that	 I	don’t	 think	Guildenstern	has	especially	
high	 standards	 for	 what	 should	 count	 as	 surprising,	 and	 neither	 do	
I.	It’s	surprising	if	I	flick	the	light	switch	and	the	room	remains	dark.	
It’s	 surprising	 if	 a	 work	 colleague	 tells	 me	 she’ll	 be	 at	 the	 meeting	
at	3:00pm	and	then	doesn’t	show.	It’s	surprising	 if	 I	park	my	car	on	
the	street	and	then	return	an	hour	later	to	find	it	gone.	Those	are	all	
surprising	things	—	but	if	I	threw	92	fair,	ordinary	coins	and	every	one	
of	them	came	up	heads,	then	that	wouldn’t	be	surprising.	This,	at	any	
rate,	 is	 what	 I’m	 going	 to	 try	 and	 argue,	 using	 Guildenstern’s	 own	
reasoning	as	a	starting	point.	
When	I	say	that	there’s	nothing	surprising	about	a	run	of	92	heads,	
I’m	not	making	a	prediction	about	what	I,	or	anyone	else,	would	feel	
if	 we	 were	 actually	 confronted	 with	 such	 a	 thing.	 My	 claim	 is	 that	
we shouldn’t	 feel	 surprised,	 that	 we	 have	 no reason	 to	 feel	 surprised	
and,	if	we	do	feel	surprised,	then	we’re	being	irrational.	If	this	is	right,	
then	it’s	not	just	some	curiosity	about	coins	—	it	has	a	much	broader	
significance.	The	question	of	what	we	should	believe,	given	our	limited	
evidence,	is	one	over	which	a	great	deal	of	ink	has	been	spilled	—	and	
it	is	also	one	that	we	all	 face,	in	some	form,	each	day	of	our	lives.	If	
it’s	not	surprising	to	throw	92	heads	in	a	row,	then	one	very	standard,	
familiar	answer	to	this	question	is	suddenly	thrown	into	doubt.	
But	 let’s	 stay	 with	 coins	 for	 the	 time	 being.	 Guildenstern	 seems	
to	 reason	 like	 this:	 Since	 there	 is	 nothing	 surprising	 about	 any	 one	
particular	coin	landing	heads,	there’s	no	point	in	the	sequence	of	92	
consecutive	heads	at	which	anything	surprising	actually	happens.	 If	
it’s	unsurprising	for	an	event	e
1
	to	happen	and	it’s	unsurprising	for	an	
event	e
2
	to	happen,	does	that	mean	that	it’s	unsurprising	for	e
1
	and	e
2
 
to	both	happen?	Not	necessarily.	It	might	be	unsurprising	if	I	leave	for	
work	at	8:30am	and	unsurprising	if	I	arrive	at	work	at	8:31am	—	but	it	
might	be	very	surprising	if	I	leave	for	work	at	8:30am	and	arrive	at	work	
at	 8:31am.	 Clearly,	 though,	 these	 two	 events	 are	 connected	—	when	 I	
arrive	at	work	will	depend,	in	part,	on	when	I	leave	for	work,	and	that’s	
why	 it	 would	 be	 surprising	 for	 both	 of	 these	 events	 to	 occur,	 even	
though	neither	event	would	be	surprising	on	its	own.	
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Y ou	may	want	to	complain	at	this	point	that	I’m	missing	some-thing	 obvious	—	namely,	 that	 it’s	 very	 unlikely	 for	 someone	to	 throw	92	heads	 in	a	 row.	And	 if	 something	very	unlikely	
happens,	then	that’s	got	to	be	surprising,	doesn’t	it?	Surely	any	”proof”	
that	 seems	 to	 show	 otherwise	 is	 just	 some	 sort	 of	 trick	 and	 no	 real	
proof	 at	 all.	 Surely	 this	 shows	 that	 the	 conjunction	 principle	 has	 to	
be	wrong.	It	is	indeed	very	unlikely	to	throw	92	heads	in	a	row	—	per-
haps	even	more	unlikely	than	you	might	guess	at	first.	Assuming	that	
the	probability	of	any	one	coin	landing	heads	is	0.5,	and	that	the	coin	
throws	are	mutually	 independent	of	one	another,	 the	probability	of	
92	coins	landing	heads	in	a	row	is	equal	to	0.592	—	that	is,	0.5	x	0.5	x	
0.5	x	0.5	…	92	times.	And	that	is	a	very	small	number	—	approximately	
0.0000000000000000000000000002,	or	1	 in	5,000	trillion	trillion.	
This	figure	is	too	small	to	even	properly	get	one’s	head	around.	This	is	
(much)	less	than	the	chance	of	two	people	being	asked	to	randomly	
choose	a	single	grain	of	sand	from	anywhere	on	the	Earth	and	happen-
ing	to	choose	exactly the same one.	Surely	if	a	1-in-5,000-trillion-trillion	
event	 were	 to	 actually	 happen,	 then	 this	 would	 be	 near	 miraculous	
and	certainly	very	surprising.	If	you	have	this	reaction,	then	you’re	in	
good	company.
In	 the	 1760s	 the	 polymath	 Jean	 le	 Rond	 d’Alembert	 questioned	
whether	it	was	even	possible	to	observe	a	long	run	of	a	single	outcome	
when	 two	 equally	 likely	 outcomes	 could	 result	 on	 each	 trial.	 In	 a	
work	published	in	the	1840s,	Antoine	Augustin	Cournot,	one	of	 the	
pioneers	of	the	mathematics	of	probability	theory,	claimed	that	it	was	
a	“practical	certainty”	that	an	event	with	a	very	low	probability	won’t	
happen.	 But	 this	 kind	 of	 idea	 is	 perhaps	 put	 most	 starkly	 by	 Émile	
Borel	—	another	 major	 figure	 from	 the	 history	 of	 probability	 theory.	
In	his	Les probabilités et la vie (Probabilities and Life),	first	published	in	
1942,	Borel	stated,	“Events	with	a	sufficiently	small	probability	never	
occur.”	 Borel	 referred	 to	 this	 as	 a	 “law	 of	 chance”	—	indeed	 he	 once	
said	it	was	the	only	law	of	chance.	It’s	now	sometimes	known	simply	
as	”Borel’s	law”.	A	natural	first	reaction	to	Borel’s	law	is	to	think	that	
it	 can’t	 be	 exactly	 right	—	after	 all,	 improbable	 things	 do	 sometimes	
over	and	over	again,	we	can	prove	that,	for	any	series	of	n	events	e
1
	….	
en,	if	they’re	mutually	independent	and	all	unsurprising,	then	e1 & e2 
&	….	&	en	is	unsurprising.
There	were	a	number	of	problems	with	Shackle’s	system	—	problems	
which	he	never	quite	managed	to	resolve.	Indeed,	one	very	thing	that	
he	struggled	with	was	properly	fitting	the	notions	of	dependence	and	
independence	into	his	theory.	A	better,	more	complete,	mathematical	
treatment	of	surprise	is	provided	by	ranking theory,	first	described	by	
Wolfgang	 Spohn	 in	 the	 1980s.	 Ranking	 theory	 is	 a	 powerful	 formal	
framework	that	has	a	number	of	potential	applications,	surprise	being	
one.	On	 this	approach,	when	 two	events	e
1
	 and	e
2
	are	 independent,	
the	surprisingness	of	e
1
 & e
2
	(measured	now	by	a	nonnegative	integer	
0,	1,	2,	3,	4	etc.)	is	equal	to	the	sum	of	the	surprisingness	of	e
1
	and	the	
surprisingness	 of	 e
2
.	 This	 is	 a	 consequence	 of	 what	 Spohn	 calls	 the	
law of conjunction (for negative ranks),	and	our	conjunction	principle	is	
really	just	a	special	case	of	this	—	if	e
1
	and	e
2
	are	independent	and	are	
both	completely	unsurprising	(both	have	surprisingness	values	of	0),	
then	e
1
 & e
2
	is	completely	unsurprising	too.	Once	again,	by	using	this	
principle	over	and	over	again,	we	can	 infer	 that,	 for	any	series	of	n	
events	e
1
	….	en,	if	they’re	mutually	independent	and	all	unsurprising,	
then	e
1
 & e
2
	&	….	&	en	is	unsurprising.	
Put	 less	 formally,	 the	 idea	 that	 seems	 to	 be	 at	 work	 in	 both	 of	
these	 formal	 treatments	 of	 surprise	 is	 that	 the	 surprisingness	 of	 a	
conjunction	e
1
 & e
2
	must	be	a	function	of	the	surprisingness	of	e
1
,	the	
surprisingness	 of	 e
2
	 and	 the	 connection	 between	 them.	 As	 such,	 if	
e
1
	 is	 completely	 unsurprising	 and	 e
2
	 is	 completely	 unsurprising	 and	
there’s	 no	 connection	 between	 them,	 then	 there’s	 nowhere	 for	 the	
surprisingness	of	e
1
 & e
2
	to	come	from.	If	we	are	allowed	to	make	use	
of	the	conjunction	principle,	then,	in	a	way,	we	can	give	a	”proof”	that	
92	heads	in	a	row	is	not	a	surprising	event.
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exceedingly	unlikely	that	your	breath	should	have	had	precisely	the	
duration;	had	precisely	the	volume;	involved	precisely	the	number	of	
oxygen,	water,	carbon	dioxide	molecules	etc.	 that	 it	did.	 In	fact,	 this	
could	be	even more	unlikely	than	throwing	92	heads	in	a	row.	
It’s	not	only	when	we	repeatedly	flip	coins	that	something	unlikely	
is	 bound	 to	 happen	—	something	 unlikely	 is	 bound	 to	 happen	 with	
every	 intake	 of	 breath,	 every	 heartbeat,	 every	 step.	 If	 I’m	 surprised	
by	 throwing	92	consecutive	heads,	based	 just	on	 its	 low	probability,	
then	 I	 should	 be	 in	 a	 state	 of	 constant	 amazement.	 This	 is	 why	 I	
say	that	Borel’s	law	is	the	opposite	of	the	truth.	According	to	Borel’s	
law,	 unlikely	 things	 never	 happen	—	and	 yet,	 in	 a	 sense,	 everything 
that	happens	 is	an	unlikely	 thing,	once	 it	 is	seen	 in	sufficiently	high 
definition.	Another	example:	It’s	likely	that	my	phone	will	ring	at	some	
point	over	the	next	week.	So	when	my	phone	does	ring,	isn’t	that	a	
likely	event?	Well,	yes	and	no.	Whenever	my	phone	rings	it	will	have	
to	be	at	a	particular	second	of	a	particular	minute	of	a	particular	hour	
of	a	particular	day	—	and	it	was	always	extremely	unlikely	that	it	would	
ring	 at	 precisely	 that	 second.	 The	 only	 reason	 the	 claim	 ‘my	 phone	
will	ring	at	some	point	over	the	next	week’	is	likely	is	because	there	
are	so	many	different	ways	in	which	it	could	be	true.	But	every	one	of	
these	ways	is	extremely	unlikely.	The	only	reason	this	claim	is	likely	
is	 because	 it	 is	 so	 nonspecific	 about	 what	 will	 actually	 happen	—	but	
whatever	does	happen	will	be	an	unlikely	thing.	
To	sum	up	so	far:	The	conjunction	principle	allows	us	to	prove	that	
throwing	92	heads	in	a	row	is	not	surprising,	even	though	it’s	extremely	
unlikely.	One	reaction	to	this	is	to	reject	the	conjunction	principle	and	
dismiss	Guildenstern’s	reasoning.	But	this	would	be	hasty	—	because	
the	fact	that	an	event	is	extremely	unlikely	gives	us	no	reason,	in	and	
of	itself,	to	think	that	the	event	is	surprising.	
Another	possible	reason	to	think	that	92	consecutive	heads	must	be	
surprising	is	because,	when	we	flip	92	fair	coins,	what	we	should	expect 
to	happen	is	to	get	roughly	the	same	number	of	heads	and	tails	—	and	
92	heads	would	fly	in	the	face	of	this	expectation.	In	a	sense,	I	think	it’s	
right	that	we	should	expect	to	get	roughly	the	same	number	of	heads	
happen	—	but	 that	 it’s	 close	 to	 being	 right.	 Perhaps	 what	 we	 should	
say	is	not	that	improbable	events	never	happen,	but	that	it’s	very	rare	
for	them	to	happen	and	surprising	when	they	do	—	or	something	like	
that.	This	would	be	enough	to	give	us	the	result	that	92	heads	in	a	row	
is	surprising.	
I’ve	 come	 to	 think,	 though,	 that	 Borel’s	 law	 is	 not	 even	 close	 to	
being	 right	—	in	 fact	 it’s	 almost	 the	 exact	 opposite	 of	 the	 truth.	 One	
very	 important	 difference	 between	 the	 mathematics	 of	 probability	
and	 the	 mathematics	 of	 surprise	 (on	 both	 Shackle’s	 treatment	 and	
the	ranking	theoretic	treatment)	is	that	we	can	have	a	setup	in	which	
every	 possible	 outcome	 is	 highly	 improbable,	 but	 we	 cannot	 have	
a	 situation	 in	 which	 every	 possible	 outcome	 is	 highly	 surprising.	
Improbability	 and	 surprisingness	 cannot	 be	 the	 same	 thing.	 Come	
back	 to	 the	 case	 of	 the	 92	 coin	 throws.	 If	 we	 are	 going	 to	 throw	 92	
coins	in	a	row,	then	we	know	in	advance	that	there	is	going	to	be	some 
sequence	 of	 92	 results	—	if	 not	 heads	 every	 time	 (HHHHHHHH…),	
then	it’s	going	to	be	some	mixture	of	heads	and	tails	in	some	sort	of	
order	(HTTHHTHT…	or	TTHTHTHH…	etc.).	And	here’s	 the	 thing:	
each	one	of	these	sequences	is	just as unlikely	as	92	heads	in	a	row.	In	
fact,	 each	 of	 these	 sequences	 has	 a	 probability	 of	 0.592.	 If	 we	 throw	
92	coins	 in	a	 row,	 then	a	 1-in-5,000-trillion-trillion	event	 is bound to 
happen	—	and,	as	such,	we	shouldn’t	be	surprised	when	a	1-in-5,000-
trillion-trillion	event	does happen.	
If	 I’m	surprised	by	92	heads	 in	a	row,	on	 the	grounds	 that	 it’s	so	
unlikely,	 then	 I’d	 have	 to	 be	 surprised	 by	 any	 sequence	 that	 came	
up	—	surprised	 no matter how the 92 coins land.	 This	 already	 seems	
like	a	bad	enough	result,	but	 it	goes	much	further	than	coin	throws.	
Perhaps	you	just	took	a	breath.	Nothing	unlikely	about	that,	you	might	
think	—	or	 is	 there?	 If	 you	 just	 took	a	breath,	 then	 it	must	have	had	
some	 precise	 duration;	 there	 must	 have	 been	 some	 precise	 volume	
that	 was	 inhaled	 and	 exhaled;	 indeed,	 there	 must	 have	 been	 some	
precise	number	of	oxygen	molecules,	water	molecules,	carbon	dioxide	
molecules	etc.	 that	entered	and	 left	your	 lungs	and	so	on.	We	don’t	
know	 what	 these	 numbers	 are,	 of	 course,	 but	 we	 know	 this:	 It	 is	
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will	be	one	of	those	in	the	set.	But	this	doesn’t	mean	that	we	should	
suddenly	regard	the	sequences	outside	the	set	as	surprising.	If	we	took	
some	sequence	from	inside	the	set,	and	some	sequence	from	outside	
the	set,	there	would	be	no	reason	at	all	to	regard	the	latter	as	being	any	
more	surprising	than	the	former.
So	 yes,	 there	 is	 one	 sense	 in	 which	 we	 should	 “expect”	 to	 get	
around	 46	 heads	—	we	 should	 regard	 this	 as	 highly	 likely,	 or	 assign	
it	a	high	probability.	The	set	of	sequences	in	which	we	have	around	
46	heads	covers	a	 large	proportion	of	 the	 total	 set	of	outcomes.	But	
there’s	another	sense	in	which	we	shouldn’t	“expect”	to	get	around	46	
heads	—	we	shouldn’t	believe that this is going to happen.	We	shouldn’t	
believe	 that	 the	 sequences	 outside	 the	 set	 won’t	 come	 up,	 while	
keeping	an	open	mind	about	the	sequences	inside	the	set.	There	are	
no	grounds	for	this	—	the	sequences	are	all	on	a	par.
T his	 leads	 right	 to	 the	 final	 topic	 that	 I	 want	 to	 discuss:	 the	relation	between	surprise	and	belief.	While	questions	about	what	 is	surprising	do	have	some	 interest	 in	 their	own	right,	
what	makes	them	really	significant	is	precisely	the	way	in	which	they	
seem	to	be	bound	up	with	questions	about	what	we	should	believe	
(and	this,	indeed,	is	precisely	why	Shackle	and	Spohn	were	interested	
in	surprise).	Generally	speaking,	surprise	is	what	we	experience	when	
the	world	doesn’t	match	our	beliefs	—	if	we	believe	that	something	is	
going	to	happen	and	it	doesn’t,	or	we	believe	that	something	isn’t	go-
ing	 to	happen	and	 it	does,	 then	that’s	surprising	 for	us.	Surprise	 is	a	
guide	to	belief.
Furthermore,	 if	 we	 have	 reason	 to	 believe	 that	 something	 isn’t	
going	to	happen,	then	we	have	reason	to	be	surprised	if	it	does	happen.	
Or,	 to	 put	 it	 another	 way,	 if	 we	 have	 no	 reason	 to	 be	 surprised	 if	 a	
certain	event	happens,	then	we	have	no	reason	to	believe	that	it	won’t	
happen	—	we	 should	 keep	 an	 open	 mind	 about	 it.	 Rational surprise 
is	a	guide	 to	 rational belief.	 If	 it’s	 right	 that	we	have	no	 reason	 to	be	
and	 tails	—	but	 talk	 about	 “expectations”	 is	 somewhat	 ambiguous.	
Probability	theorists	define	the	“expected	value”	of	a	random	variable	
to	be	the	probability-weighted	average	of	the	possible	values	that	the	
variable	could	 take.	The	number	of	heads	 in	92	coin	 throws	can	be	
considered	a	random	variable	and,	if	the	coins	are	fair	and	the	throws	
are	independent,	then	its	expected	value	is	indeed	46.
If	we	plot	the	probabilities	of	obtaining	n	heads	in	92	fair,	independent	
coin	throws,	then	this	will	approximate	a	normal	distribution	or	“bell	
curve”	 with	 its	 peak	 at	 46.	 We	 can	 calculate	 that	 the	 probability	 of	
getting	 exactly	 46	 heads	 is	 around	 8.3%,	 the	 probability	 of	 getting	
between	40	and	50	heads	is	around	73.8%,	the	probability	of	getting	
between	30	and	60	heads	is	around	99.9%	and	so	on.	Obviously,	the	
outcome	in	which	we	get	92	heads	is	located	right	in	the	extreme	tail	
of	the	curve	(over	9	standard	deviations	above	the	mean,	if	we	want	to	
put	it	in	these	terms).	Does	this	mean	that	we	should	regard	92	heads	
in	a	row	as	a	surprising	result?	Undoubtedly,	there	are	cases	in	which	
it’s	surprising	to	observe	an	extreme	divergence	from	an	average	—	but	
is	this	one	of	those	cases?
Consider	the	claim	‘there	will	be	between	40	and	50	heads’	—	the	
kind	of	thing	that	we’re	meant	to	“expect”.	Although	we	can	calculate	
this	claim	to	be	approx.	73.8%	likely,	it’s	not	as	though	there	is	some	
special	force	compelling	the	coins	to	fall	in	this	way.	The	claim	‘there	
will	be	between	40	and	50	heads’	is	a	bit	like	the	claim	‘my	phone	will	
ring	at	some	point	over	 the	next	week’	—	the	only	reason	 it	 is	 likely	
to	be	true	is	that	there	are	so	many	different	ways	in	which	it	could	
be	true	(each	of	which	is	extremely	unlikely).	In	fact,	there	are	about	
3,700	trillion	trillion	different	sequences	of	92	coin	throws	that	feature	
between	 40	 and	 50	 heads	 in	 some	 combination.	 This	 is	 a	 large	 set,	
but	there’s	nothing	special	about	the	sequences	that	make	it	up	—	no	
reason	 to	 prefer	 them	over	 the	 1,300	 trillion	 trillion	or	 so	 remaining	
sequences.	As	we’ve	seen,	all	of	the	sequences	are	equally	likely,	and	
any	one	could	come	about	just	as	easily	as	any	other.	In	fact,	we	could	
pick	any	set	of	3,700	trillion	trillion	sequences,	on	whatever	basis	we	
like,	and	 it	will	be	approx.	73.8%	probable	 that	 the	actual	 sequence	
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the	sort	of	thing	that	can	“just	so	happen”	—	there	has	 to	be	more	to	
the	story.	If	I	park	my	car	on	the	street,	it	would	be	natural	to	believe,	
in	an	hour’s	time,	that	it’s	still	there.	I	think	it	can	be	rational to	believe	
this	too,	because	there	would	have	to	be	some	explanation	if	it	turned	
out	to	be	false.
It’s	 obvious	 that,	 if	 the	 coins	 land	 THTTHHTH…	 or	 land	
TTHTHTHH…,	there	doesn’t	have	to	be	any	special	explanation	for	
this	—	after	all,	the	coins	had	to	land	in	some	way,	and	it	might	just	as	
well	have	been	these	ways	as	any	other.	When	it	comes	to	a	run	of	92	
heads,	we	might	be	tempted	to	think	that	there	really	does	have	to	be	
some	explanation	in	this	case	—	thus	our	temptation	to	think	that	this	
would	be	a	surprising	event.	Psychologists	have	found	that	people	are	
generally	unwilling	to	accept	that	outcomes	exhibiting	some	striking	
pattern	could	arise	through	a	purely	random	process.	It’s	for	this	reason	
that	people	are	generally	reluctant	to	pick	consecutive	numbers	like	
‘1234567’	 in	 the	 lottery.	People	will	often	 try	 to	 find	some	deliberate,	
intentional	 process	 behind	 a	 patterned	 outcome	—	even	 preferring	
something	supernatural	(as	Guildenstern	does	initially)	to	admitting	
that	there’s	no	special	explanation	to	be	found.	But	‘1234567’	is	as	good	
a	lottery	pick	as	any	other	—	a	fair	lottery	could	produce	this	result	just	
as	easily	as	any	other	result.	And	throwing	92	fair	coins	could	produce	
a	sequence	of	92	heads	just	as	easily	as	any	other	sequence.
What,	 in	 any	 case,	 is	 the	 point	 of	 surprise?	 What	 would	 we	 be	
missing	 in	 our	 lives	 if	 we	 never	 felt	 surprised	 by	 anything	—	if	 we	
greeted	 everything	 with	 a	 shrug?	 I	 think	 we	 would	 be	 missing	
something	crucial	—	for	part	of	 the	purpose	of	 surprise	 is	 to	spur	us	
into	action.	If	an	event	surprises	us,	then	that	prompts	us	to	investigate	
why	and	how	it	happened	—	to	try	and	explain	it.	There	is	something	
agitating	 about	 a	 feeling	 of	 surprise,	 an	 agitation	 that	 abates	 only	
when	a	satisfying	explanation	is	found.	This	is	why	surprise	would	be	
such	an	inappropriate	reaction	to	a	sequence	of	92	coin	throws,	like	
THTTHHTH….	As	unlikely	as	this	sequence	might	be,	it	can	just	so	
happen	 that	 this	 is	 the	 sequence	 that	 came	 up,	 and	 there’s	 nothing	
surprised	by	throwing	92	heads	in	a	row,	it	follows	that	we	shouldn’t	
believe	in	advance	that	this	won’t	happen.	
Questions	 about	 when	 we	 are	 justified	 or	 rational	 in	 believing	
things	 have	 been	 discussed	 a	 great	 deal	 by	 philosophers,	 scientists,	
legal	theorists	and	many	others.	Many	of	those	who	have	considered	
such	questions	have	converged	on	the	view	that	probabilities	 should	
be	 our	 guide	 when	 forming	 beliefs	—	that	 we	 should	 believe	 those	
things	that	are	likely	to	be	true,	disbelieve	those	things	that	are	likely	
to	be	false,	and	otherwise	suspend	judgment.	Call	this	the	probability 
principle. The	 thought	 seems	 to	 be	 that	 believing	 something	 is	 a	 bit	
like	taking	a	gamble	on	what	the	world	is	like	—	and	if	the	odds	are	in	
my	favour,	then	the	gamble	should	be	a	rational	one.	In	many	ways	
this	is	a	very	appealing	and	powerful	picture	—	but,	in	the	end,	I	don’t	
think	that	belief	is	like	this,	and	I	don’t	think	the	probability	principle	
is	correct.	It’s	very	likely	that	the	coins	won’t	land	THTTHHTH…	and	
very	 likely	 that	 they	 won’t	 land	 TTHTHTHH…	 and	 so	 on.	 While	 it	
might	 be	 perfectly	 rational	 for	 me	 to	 bet	 on	 these	 things,	 it’s	 not	
rational	 for	 me	 to	 believe	 them.	 If	 the	 coins	 did	 land	 THTTHHTH…	
or	land	TTHTHTHH…,	then	it	would	not	be	rational	to	be	surprised.	
In	 actual	 fact,	 exceptions	 to	 the	 probability	 principle	 are	 all	 around	
us	—	for	some	large	number	n,	it’s	very	likely	that	n	won’t	be	the	exact	
number	of	oxygen	molecules	that	I	inhale	on	my	next	breath,	but	it’s	
not	rational	for	me	to	believe	this.	
What	 should	 we	 believe	 then?	 If	 probabilities	 are	 not	 the	 key	 to	
justified,	rational	belief,	then	what	is?	Earlier	on	I	gave	some	examples	
of	things	that	I	thought	would	be	genuinely	surprising	—	like	this:	If	I	
park	my	car	on	the	street	and	then	return	an	hour	later	to	find	that	the	
car	 is	no	 longer	where	 I	parked	 it,	 then	 that’s	surprising.	While	 this	
may	well	be	an	unlikely	event,	what	seems	more	significant	is	that	it’s	
an	 event	 that	 demands	 explanation	 of	 some	 kind.	 Perhaps	 someone	
broke	into	the	car	and	stole	it.	Perhaps	I	parked	illegally	and	the	car	
was	 then	towed.	Perhaps	 I	didn’t	properly	apply	 the	handbrake	and	
the	car	rolled	away….	Whatever	the	truth,	it	can’t	“just	so	happen”	that	
the	car	is	now	gone	and	there’s	nothing	more	to	the	story.	This	isn’t	
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regard	it	as	extremely	likely	that	I	won’t	throw	92	heads	in	a	row,	but	I	
can’t	rationally	believe	it.	
These	ideas	about	rational	belief	are,	of	course,	very	sketchy,	and	I	
won’t	try	to	pursue	them	further	here.	Maybe	they	aren’t	even	on	the	
right	track	at	all.	But	what	I	hope	I	have	shown	here,	at	the	very	least,	
is	that	there	is	a	different	way	of	looking	at	surprise	and	belief,	and	that	
a	“Guildensternian”	theory	of	surprise	can	be	defended.	I	mentioned	
at	the	outset	that	it’s	common	for	absurdist	plays	to	feature	fantastical	
events	 that	 are	 left	 unexplained.	 Another	 very	 common	 trope	 in	
absurdist	drama	 is	 for	characters	 to	 reason	 in	nonsensical	ways	and	
to	jump	to	bizarre	conclusions.	Guildenstern’s	first	three	hypotheses	
about	 the	 coin-throwing	 episode	 are	 indeed	 bizarre.	 And	 so	 too,	 I	
suppose,	 is	 his	 fourth	 hypothesis	—	but	 it	 also,	 just	 maybe,	 happens	
to	be	true.	
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